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In this paper, we discuss equilibrium and perfect equilibrium in a
simplified model of the supergame. We assume that players can observe
the mixed moves employed by all players at each previous stage. For
this model, we obtain a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium
outcomes, and a fairly weak sufficient condition for this set to coincide
with the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes. Inter alia
,
simple proofs
of the Folk Theorem and the result that the requirement of perfection
does not eliminate any equilibrium outcomes for the undiscounted supergame
are presented.

Equilibrium and Perfection in Discounted Supergames, I: Public Lotteries
I. Introduction
This paper deals with some results on the characterisation of pay-
offs sustainable by equilibria or perfect equilibria of infinitely-
repeated games with discounting. This work extends previous work on
supergames without discounting by Aumann (1976) , Aumann and Shapley, and
Rubenstein (1977) . In this paper, we work with a simplified model of the
supergame used by Roth and Rubenstein (1977), in which players can observe
the behavioral strategies used by their opponents at the conclusion of each
play. In a subsequent paper, we show that passage to the more general
model in which only the realisations of these strategies can be observed
does not materially affect the results.
In the undiscounted case, where players evaluate the infinite streams
of payoffs accruing to them by the limit of means, should it exist, it
has been demonstrated that any outcome that is feasible and individually
rational in the stage game can be sustained by a Nash Equilibrium of the
supergame. In this context, an outcome is feasible if it belongs to the
convex hull of the pure-strategy payoffs and is individually rational
if it yields each player a payoff at least as great as his minmax payoff
in the game. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the additional
requirement of perfection does not affect the set of outcomes.
In the supergame with discounting, we shall find that neither of
these results goes through. In the first place, not all outcomes in the
convex hull of the pure-strategy payoffs are feasible. Of those out-
comes which are feasible, not all the individually rational ones can
be obtained as equilibrium outcomes for the discounted supergame, since
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myopic players will not be deterred by the promise of eventual punish-
ment. Finally, not all equilibrium outcomes can be supported by perfect
equilibrium outcomes, although there are several sufficient conditions
that include many games of theoretical and economic interest.
The organisation of the paper is as follows: in the first section
we describe the model of the supergame we are using. In the second
section, we describe the set of attainable outcomes in the discounted
supergame. The third section characterises the set of equilibrium out-
comes, while the fourth section describes certain sufficient conditions
for this set to co-incide with the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes,
and provides a simple economic example of the possibility that these
sets may differ.
II. The model
The verbal description of the model is as follows : we begin with
a stage game in normal (strategic) form, with a finite number of players,
each of whom selects one of a finite number of pure strategies. This
game is to be played a denumerable infinity of times, and at each play,
the choices of the players are allowed to depend on the entire previous
history of the game. In particular, this means that each player is
allowed to observe the mixed strategy in the stage game used by each
of opponents at each previous stage. This is a strong assumption,
and requires some justification. One justification is that one might
think of this as a situation in which only pure strategies are allowed,
and where the stage game has a continuous payoff function defined
over convex, compact and finite-dimensional pure strategy sets
for each player. Another interpretation is that the players meet on
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successive days, but that play during each day consists of a sufficiently
large number of repetitions of the specified mixed strategies for that
day that each player can observe the mixtures used by his opponents with
probability arbitrarily close to unity. To this, we add the further
condition that discounting is done on a daily, rather than a continuous
basis, and that players' strategies are fixed during the course of each
day's play. A stronger justification will be provided in the sequel,
where we demonstrate that the only effect of relaxing the assumption is
to shrink the set of attainable outcomes, and that the restrictions of
the sets of equilibrium and perfect equilibrium outcomes found in this
paper to the new set of attainable outcomes form the new sets of equi-
librium and perfect equilibrium outcomes. The result of an n-tuple of
supergame strategies is an infinite sequence of n-tuples of mixed strat-
egies in the stage game; to this, we associate a corresponding infinite
random sequence of payoffs. There are various ways for the players to
evaluate these sequences, but we shall concentrate on the discounted
sum, normalised to lie within the convex hull of the payoffs in the
stage game.
2.1 Definition : The stage game is a triple [N,S,h], where N is a finite
set of players ; S = x S . is the set of n-tuples of pure strategies
i«N X
(also finite), and h: S + R is the payoff function . We also define
the mixed extension of the stage game to be the triple [N,M,H] , where
N is as above; M = * M. is the set of mixed strategies , with generic
iSN X
member
m = (m. , . .
.
,m ) where, for each i
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m. £ A | S .
J
is a probability distribution on the members of S .
,
Thus, m is a probability distribution on the members of S, although not
all such probability distributions (called correlated strategies ) can be
represented as members of M. If m(s) is the probability that the n-tuple
of pure strategies s, will be played:
m(s.
, . .
.
,s ) = IT m. (s .)
1 n ._,, 1 l
we define the expected payoff H(m) by
H(m) = Z m(s)h(s)
s
It is clearly a continuous function, linear in each of the numbers m.(s.)
2.2 Definition : Let [N,S,h] = G be a stage game; G* = [N,F,P] is a
supergame of G if the following are satisfied: F = x F. is the space
i^N
1
of pure supergame strategies. For each member f. S F., we write
f. = (f.,...,f.,...), where
i l l
f
1
^ S.
l l
f
Z
: [S]
t_1
-» S,
and P = [P, ,...,P ] where each P. is a partial ordering on the space RIn i
of infinite sequences of real numbers. P. represents the preferences of
player i over the infinite streams of payoffs resulting from plays of
the supergame.
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2.3 Definition ; Let G* be a supergame, and f an n-tuple of pure
strategies for the supergame. We can calculate a sequence
s(f) = (s (f),...,s (f),...) of outcomes in the stage game as follows:
s
1 (f) = r
X (f) = (f1 f
1
) = f
1
1 n
s
C
(f) = (f
1
t (rt-1 (f)),...,f t (r t
"1 (f))) = fV1 ^))i n
r
t (f) = (r^C^.s'Cf))
Thus, s (f) is the action specified by f for the t— play of the game
(if all previous plays have been according to f) , and r (f) is the cumu-
lative record of play up to and including the play on date t. To the
sequence s(f) we can associate a sequence of payoffs
g(f) = (g, (f) ,...,g^(f),...,
g
i
(f) ,...) in the obvious way, using the
pure strategy payoff function h from the stage game:
gj(f) = hi(s
t (f))
and for convenience, we shall write g(f) - (g (f),..., g (f ),...) and
g(f) = (
g;L
(f),...,g
n
(f)).
2.4 Definition : A discounted supergame is a supergame where each player
i is characterised by a discount rate 6. £ [0,1], and has the preference
i t ] t °°
relation P. defined by (x ,...,x ,...) P. (y ,...,y ,...) (where x,y e R )
iff
oo
hj(x) = (1 - 6.) E 6 t_1x t 1 (1 - S±) Z &
t
±
~1
y
t
= h*(y)
t=i
1
t=l
By an obvious abuse of notation, we can define a payoff function
h : F ->R for the discounted supergame:
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hj(f) =iu( gi (f))
One of the nicest features of the discounted supergame is that with this
payoff function, the set of payoffs h (F) is a compact subset of CH(h(S))
and also that h (f) is continuous in f. There are other preference rela-
tions that have been used, including the first Caesaro mean of the pay-
offs and the overtaking relation. However, the first of these will not
give an answer for payoff sequences that are not Caesaro summable, while
the second cannot be represented by a payoff function. The next problem
is that of mixed strategies . Since these supergames are games of perfect
recall, it follows from Aumann's (1964) extension of Kuhn's (1953) theorem
that it is sufficient to confine our attention to behavioral strategies;
in this case, a behavioral strategy is a device which selects a mixed
strategy in each stage game.
2.5 Definition : Let G* be a supergame, and define F = x F. to be the
i€N 1
space of m-tuples of behavioral strategies for the supergame. The generic
member f. € F. is defined by:
I1 e m.
i i
IS [M] t_1 + M.
i L l
For any n-tuple f of behavioral strategies, we can calculate a sequence
m(f) of mixed stage game outcomes as follows:
m
1
^) = (?*..,
f
1
) = I1 = rL (f)
1 n
mM) = (f!: (r t" 1 (f)),...,f t (r t" 1 (f))) -f^r^Cf))
1 n
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r
C (f) = [r
t"1 (f),mt (f)]
Since the choices are independent at each stage, the expected payoff
sequence is well-defined by G(f) = [G.(f): i £ N, t = 1, . .
. ] , where
G.(f) = H.(m (f)). The discounted-supergame "payoff function" resulting
00
from this definition is H6 : ? •* Rn , where H6 (7) = I 6 t
"1
G
t (T).
1
t=l
It only remains to define equilibrium and perfect equilibrium for
the discounted supergame.
2.6 Definition ; Let f S F be an n-tuple of behavioural strategies for
the discounted supergame G*. We say that f is a Nash Equilibrium iff,
for each player i, and each behavioral strategy f! 6 F
.
, we have
where?,., denotes the n-1 tuple (f", f i-l'i+1' * * '
'
f
n^
° f behavioral
strategies used by the other players. f is a perfect equilibrium iff,
for every t, and for every member m' of [M] , the "continuation strategy"
T'( :m') defined by:
f! (m ,...,m : m') = f. (m ,m , . .
.
,m )
is an equilibrium in G*. As a further matter of notation, we shall de-
note the set of members of CH(h(S)) that can be achieved as H (f) for
some Nash Equilibrium f by e.p. , while the subset of e.p. that can be
achieved by perfect equilibria will be denoted p. e.p.
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III. The Set of Attainable Outcomes
This section concerns the observation that, for sufficiently small
values of the individual discount rates, it may happen that not all mem-
bers of CH(h(S)) can be achieved in behavioral strategies, let alone in
pure strategies. This is in sharp contrast to the situation for the
undiscounted game, where any point in CH(h(S)) can be achieved in pure
strategies, by playing the relevant pure strategy n-tuples of the stage
game with frequencies that correspond to the weights used in the convex
combinations forming CH(h(S)) .
For simplicity, we work with the case where &. = 6, for all i. In
any game [N,S,h], we can isolate three subsets of CH(h(S)), corresponding
to the outcomes that can be achieved using pure, mixed and correlated
strategies in each stage. Lett C = CH(S) be the set of correlated strat-
egies for the stage game, we define
3.1 Definition: D = {x e CH(h(S)) s.t. there exists an infinite sequence
P
(s ,...,s ,...) of members of S with the property that
00
x = (1 - 6) Z fi^hCs')}
t=l
5 It
D = {x e CH(h(S)) s.t. there exists an infinite sequence (m ,...,m ,...)
m
of members of M with the property that
00
x = (1 - 6) Z S
t"'l
E(,m
t
)
t=l
D = {x e CH(h(S)) s.t. there exists an infinite sequence
c
(c ,...,c ,...) of members of C with the property that
x = (1 - 6) Z 6
t"1H(ct)
t=l
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Clearly, since H(C) = CH(h(S)), we have D = CH(h(S)) for all 6. More-
over, in cases where H(M) = CH(h(S)), as with Prisoner's Dilemma, we
have D = CH(h(S)). In general, the definition of the set of attainable
m
points will hinge on the set of weights that can be obtained through the
use of the relevant strategies. For example, if the discount rate is
0.1, the first pure (or mixed) payoff will have a weight of 0.9; this
means that the eventual discounted sum must be close to one of the orig-
inal pure or mixed strategy payoffs for the stage game. To see what this
means in terms of D
,
let us observe that the weight given to a particular
P
pure-strategy outcome must be of the form
CO
(1 - 6) E a 5
t-1
t=l
where a = (a..
, . . .
,a ,. . .) is some infinite sequence of 0's and l's. If
we are taking convex combinations of m such pure-strategy outcomes, we
need a characterisation of the feasible convex combinations.
3.2 Definition : Let A e (0,1) , and let A be the standard m-simplex.
Define
A j. = {A € A : there exist sequences a.,..., a s.t.
i) a. = (a. , . .
.
,a., . „
.) , a. {0,1} each i,t1111
m
t
ii) for all t, Z a. = 1, and
i=l
X
00
iii) A. = (1 - 6) I a
t
6
t"1
}
t=l i
This is the set of weights on pure-strategy payoffs available via the use
of pure strategies in the discounted supergame. We have the following
result.
-li-
lt is clear that for all t, i, X. _> , and that for all i,
lim X. = 0. Moreover, from the construction it follows that for all T,
t-w»
A . XJ+1 + (1 - 6) Z aV11 X
t-1 "
which completes the proof. QED
When we turn to mixed strategies, we should expect some relaxation of
this condition. Indeed, in many cases we can achieve the entire set of
outcomes. We shall not continue with our characterisation of the set
of attainable outcomes, since there is insufficient generality to war-
rant it. However, we shall observe that there is a natural upper bound
for i that in most cases is less than the number of pure-strategy com-
binations. CH(h(S)) C Rn , so that we need use no more than N+l pure-
strategy combinations. On the other hand, if N >_ 2 and |S. | >_ 2 for
each i, then |s| > N+l so we obtain:
Theorem 2.^ : If 6 >_ 1 - — , then the set of outcomes obtainable via pure
strategies coincides with CH(h(S)).
We close this section with an example of a well-known game where
D t D
6
t D°: the Battle of the Sexes. This is a two-player game,
p m c
where each player has two pure strategies:
L R
T (2,1) (0,0)
B (0,0) (1,2)
To begin with, the following three figures show the stage-game payoffs
to pure, mixed and correlated strategies, respectively.
m-10-
3.3 Proposition : 6 > m " 1 , iff A™ = A
m
.
*
— m o
Proof : if a. = 1, then A. > (1 - 6), so a necessary condition for the
conclusion of the Proposition is that max X . >_ (1 - 6) for every X G A
But X S A implies that max X. > —, and this bound is tight, so we know
l — m
i
the necessary condition is only satisfied if
1 i <• t- m - 1
— > 1 - 6; or 6 >
m — — m
It remains to be shown that no further restrictions result from the choice
of subsequent weights. To do this, we shall exhibit a procedure by which
the a. can be calculated explicitly. To begin with, fix X S A . Let
in e argmax X.. We know that X. > — , so that by hypothesis, X. > 1 - 6.l.i 1, — m l, —
i 1 1
Therefore, let us set a. =1, and a. = for all i p i.. , and form a new
vector X by X. = X. for j r i, , and X. = X. - (1 - 6) . This new vector
belongs to
m
A° = {X G R°: Z X. = 1 - (1 - 6) = 6}
1
3-1 J
1 X
Once again, we know that max X . > — . The condition for us to be able to
l — m
2
X
1
choose a appropriately is that max X. >_ (1 - 6)6, so that this condition
i
is satisfied if
6 /, <.\ ,. . m — 1
— > (1 - 6)6; or 6 >
m — — m
so that successive levels of choice of a introduce no new conditions.
We have now demonstrated the truth of the Proposition, since the procedure
begun above can be iterated by choosing i € arg max X. , setting
a
C
=1 = 1- a C , all i + i , and letting X. = X. for j j= i , while
i 2 t J J t
,t+l ,t fT, n x .X. =a. «= o (1 - 6)
.
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\ •
pure mixed correlated
To construct the set of payoffs obtainable via pure strategies, given a
small discount rate, we first add a shrunken replica of the convex hull
of the original payoffs near each of the pure-strategy payoffs. The
final payoff must lie within one of these convex hulls; which one is
determined by the choice of the first-period strategy combination. Next
to this we have repeated the process within each of the nex convex hulls,
adding shrunken replicas to the vertices representing the pure choices
at the first and second stages. The process continues inductively, re-
sulting in a sparse nondenumerable set of payoffs.
i>
>
Stage 1
>
>A
Stage 2 Stage 3
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To construct D
,
the process is only slightly more complicated. For
each point in the set of payoffs obtainable via mixed strategies, there
will be a shrunken replica of that set, and we must take the envelope
of these attached replicas. In the following figures, we show a few of
these attached replicas, and the envelope of those replicas.
First stage ; some replicas the envelope
The next step is to repeat the process for each point added at the
second step: this means that we must remain within the envelope of the
convex hulls of the shrunken replicas added at the first stage: this
envelope, shown in the left-hand figure below, represents the maximum
area we can hope for. In the figure on the right, we have illustrated
the result of this second step,
The outer limit the second-stage envelope
-14-
XXX
These pictures make it clear that D t D ^ D .r p m c
IV. Equilibrium in the discounted supergame
Any n-tuple of supergame strategies can be divided into two parts:
the specified sequence s(f) that results from adherence to the strategies
f , and various contingent sequences resulting from deviations from the
specified sequence. Since each player knows the strategy descriptions
of the other players in the equilibrium, each player can predict the
future course of play for any choice of his own actions.
One immediate consequence is that any n-tuple of supergame strat-
egies whose specified sequence consists of equilibria of the stage game,
and which makes the same prescription for any history is an equilibrium.
Thus, any sequence consisting of members of the set of stage-game equi-
libria can be sustained as the outcome of such an "open loop" equilibrium
for any monotonic evaluation relation.
In general we shall be concerned with outcomes that cannot be
achieved in this manner, so that we shall need to consider the concept
of punishment . In general, the worst punishment that can be inflicted
on a player in any single play of the game is that which holds him to
his minmax security level. There are two reasons for using this security
level rather than the (lower) maxmin level. The first is that the pun-
ishment to be used against a defector forms part of the declared strat-
egies of the other players, so that the defecting player can adapt his
"defense" to the specific punishment. The second is that in this game
all lotteries are public, so that there is no way that the other players
can use a correlated punishment against the defector. Of course, if they
-15-
were able to use correlated punishments, there would be no difference
between the minmax and maxmin levels; both would co-incide with the value
of the two-person zero-sum game played between the defector (the maxi-
mising player) and the others (the minmising player), over the defector's
payoffs.
From this observation, it follows that the strongest punishment
that can be inflicted on a defector in the supergame is to hold him to
his minmax level in all plays following the detection of a deviation.
Such a punishment is called a grim punishment . We observe that a player
can be deterred from defecting from a particular specified sequence if
and only if the threat of grim punishment is sufficient to deter him.
4.1 Definition : Let [N,M,H] be the mixed extension of a normal-form
game. For each i € N, define p £ M, as follows:
p,.s £ arg min [max H. (m. ,m, .,. )](1) & 1 x' (l)
m . . . m
.
(i) i
p ±
G arg max H^m^p^)
m.
i
This is the minmax punishment and defense to be used when player i de-
fects. Let v. = H.(p ) be player i's minmax security level .
—1 —
t
Let [m
, . .
.
,m ,...] be an infinite sequence of members of M. The grim
strategy supporting m = [m ,...] is the n-tuple f of supergame strategies
defined by
f
.
= m. for all i, and
l l
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'W iff there exists T < t s.t.
t' —
t'
i) m = m for all t' < T
,t, 1 t-lv J . .s T -T - „ . , .f
. (m , . . . ,m ) = c 11) m, = m, for all kf j
T Tiii) m. ^ m.
\m. if not
In other words, the grim stategy plays according to the cooperative se-
quence until the first date when a defection occurs. If a single player
is responsible for that defection, then that player is punished forever.
In the undiscounted game, a player contemplating defection from a
grim strategy supporting a specified sequence m has the choice of two
outcomes: lim H.(m ) if he does not defect, and v. if he does. If the
i 1
t-*=°
first limit exists, i.e., if the sequence H.(m ) is Caesaro-convergent,
player i will adhere to the grim strategy iff the first of these numbers
exceeds the second. This is the "first Folk Theorem" of the undiscounted
supergame:
4.2 Theorem : the set of limiting-average payoffs to equilibria of the
undiscounted supergame is {ye CH(h(S)): y. ^_v., all I € N}.
One striking feature of this result is that the outcomes can be
characterised purely by their payoffs; no strategic considerations enter
in. In particular, the immediate profit earned by the defector plays no
role. Unfortunately, this is not true in the discounted game, so that
the characterisation of equilibrium outcomes involves explicitly the
strategic aspects of the specified sequence. However, it is still the
case that the sine qua non of equilibrium is the existence of a grim-
strategy equilibrium supporting the outcome, so that we obtain:
-17-
4.3 Theorem: y £ D is the outcome of an equilibrium of the discounted
m
—1 —t —
supergame iff there exists an infinite sequence (m , . . . ,m , ...) = m of
members of M with the following properties:
ao
i) for all i, y = (1 - 6
±
) Z <5
t~1
H
i
(mt )
t=l
1
ii) for all i,T
(1) Z sT
mT
R
±
CSh >.max H^nu/m*..) + (6^(1 - & ±))v ±
t>T
1
m.
— l
or
(2)
_
T-l
y. > (1 - 6.) [max H.(m.,m* ) + Z 6 t
~T
H.(mt)] + 6. v.
m. t=l
In particular, if y € H(M) , y is the outcome of a stationary equilibrium
of the discounted supergame iff there exists m* £ M s.t.
iii) H(m*) = y
iv) for all i £ N
(3) y ± 1 (1 - 6.)max H i (m.,m^ i) ) + & ±v± .
ffi
i
Proof:
Stationary Equilibrium : Let us suppose that player i wishes to defect
from a stationary grim strategy supporting the sequence m*,m*,.... If
he does not defect, his payoff will be y.; if he does defect, his pay-
off will be at most max H.(m.,m*.«) in the first period and at most v±
m.
in all subsequent periods. The normalised discounted payoff to his
best defection is therefore the RES of condition (3) . This shows the
sufficiency of the condition. Necessity follows from the following
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observation: in any supergame strategy combination with stationary
specified sequence m*,m*,..., the payoff to the best defection will be
greater than or equal to the payoff to the best defection against the
grim strategy supporting this outcome.
In general, this will be true: if m is any infinite sequence, and
f is any supergame strategy supporting this sequence (i.e., m (f) = m ),
then
maxHj(f',f
(
.
)
) 1 maxH
5
i
(f
1 ,g (i) )
i i
where g is the grim strategy supporting m.
Nonstationary equilibrium : In general, it may be the case that D
strictly contains H(M) . If player i chooses to defect from a grim
strategy g supporting the sequence m at time T, he exchanges an expected
payoff sequence worth
Z 6
t_T
H.(m t )
t>T
X 1
—
T
for one which pays at most max H.(m.,m ) on day T, and v. in all subse-
m.
quent periods, for a total expected payoff of
max H.(m.,m,. N ) + 6.v./(l - <5.)
x 1 (l) 11 1
m.
i
as of day T, which give us the LHS and the RHS of (1), respectively.
Finally, we can obtain condition (2) by applying condition (i) to
equation (1). QED
We shall present an example which uses this theorem to characterise
the equilibrium points of Prisoner's Dilemma. Before we do so, there
-19-
are several consequences of this theorem that are worth noting. In the
first place, by letting all the discount rates go to 1 we obtain pre-
cisely the "first Folk Theorem": any feasible and individually-rational
payoff can be supported by an equilibrium of the undiscounted game.
Strictly-speaking this gives us a version of the Folk Theorem where
players use the Abel limit, rather than the first Caesaro sum to eval-
uate payoff streams. However, this poses no problems, since Caesaro
convergence implies Abel convergence.
Another interesting feature of this result can be noted by letting
the discount rate shrink to 0, condition (3) becomes the usual condition
for Nash Equilibrium, while condition (1) limits us to precisely those
sequences with which we began this section; sequences calling for a
stage-game Nash equilibrium at every stage.
Finally, it will be noted that condition (1) can be written:
(4) min[ S 6. H.(m ) - max H. (m. .m, .,. ] > 6.v./(l - <5
.
)
T t>T
X X
m.
X X (1) ± i
— i
and it is clear that this is monotonic in 6 . : if y is an equilibrium
outcome at 6 = (6-,..., & ) and 6! >_ 6 . for each i € N, then y is an
equilibrium outcome at <S'.
We conclude this section by characterising the outcomes of equi-
libria of a simple version of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The mixed exten-
sion of this game is an follows: let m. be the probability that player
i uses the "Greedy" Strategy, and 1 - m. be the probability that player
i uses the "Helpful" strategy. The payoff functions are:
H (m.. ,m 9 ) = 3 + nu - 3m ?
-20-
I
2
(nL,,m
2
) = 3 + m
2
- 3m
1
It follows that, for any pair (m ,m„) , the best defection is m. = 1,
so that
max H
x
(m
1
,m
2
) = 4 - 3m
2 ;
m.
l
v
x
= 1 = v
2
max H
?
(m ,m„) = 4 - 3m.. ; and
m
2
Thus, we can determine that (m ,m„) is the outcome of a stationary
supergame equilibrium iff:
(5) 3 + n^ - 3m
2
>_ (1 - 6 ) (4 - 3m
2
> + 5 ; and
(6) 3 + m
2
- 3^ >. (1 - 6 2 ) (4 - 3^) + &,
We can rearrange these linear inequalities to give a unified condition
on m:
1 - m„
(7) 1 - l6T- ml - 1 " 36 1 (1 " m2 )
In the following figure, we show the image of this set of strategies,
for discount rates 6 . between 1 and tt.
i
1^ I[
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We have labelled the boundaries of this region, to facilitate translating
these strategy pairs into pairs of payoffs. In region I, we have m„ = 0,
m. <_ 1 - TT~; in Region II, we have m. = 0, and m„ <_ —r~ ; in region III,
we have nu = 1 - tt—(1 - nO ; while in region IV, we have m- = 1 - 3<5 2 (l-m..)
— 1
In region III, m„ ranges between 1 - -rr— and 1, and in region IV between
and 1. Inserting these boundary values into the payoff function, we
get the corresponding regions in payoff space:
I: H = 3 + ny 3 - 3m
i;
n^ 6 [0,1 - —•]
II: H =
III: H =
3 - 3m
2
,
3 + m
2
; m
2
e [0,1 -—
]
IV: H = [(n^ + 95
2
(1 - n^)), (A - 3 0^ + S^l - n^)) ]
We have displayed these regions below.
Turning now to the non-stationary equilibrium outcomes, we observe
that since any outcome in D is also in H(M) = CH(h(S)), we have only
to see whether there are any outcomes which are more stable when the
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specified sequence is nonstationary . The crucial element in this is the
incentive to defect at any stage. Suppose that we are trying to support
an outcome paying (y ,y~): the stationary strategies giving this outcome
specify a repetition of (m*,m*) where
m* - | - |[y. + 3y ] i = 1,2; j = 2,1, j t i
On the other hand, if m is an infinite sequence with the same payoff, and
if m is the outcome of an equilibrium of the stage game, we have four
equations to satisfy.
(8) I m 6 -3 I m„6, = -, —(y - 3)
t=l
L 1
t=l
2 1 1-^1
(9) Z m^"1 - 3 Z m.^"1 - ]
1
; (y, - 3)
t=l
2 2
t=l
X 2 1 " « 2
2
(10) min[ Z m^"1 - 3 Z m^6^"T ] > = r-^-
T t>T
X l
t>T
2 1
~
1
" °1
l .- *^^
t t-T t t-T 2
(11) min[ Z m,«, - 3 Z ra.
c
5^
L
] >
- ~
T t>T
2 1
t>T
1 2 - 1
~
&
2
The first two being feasibility conditions, and the last two being equi-
librium conditions derived from conditions i) and ii) of Theorem 4.3.
Since we are interested in the set of outcomes, and not the sequences
that give rise to them, we may assume that there is no stationary equi-
librium paying (y.. ,y.) . Thus either
4(1 - 36
]
_) - 3(1 - S )y2
(12) Yl > (1 _ 95 ]
or
4(1 - 36J - 3(1 - 5 )y
(13) y. (1 - 96
2
)
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In terms of the strategies used by the players, from the definition of
m* we know that
(14) Z CC3 + m5 - 3m$] - [3 + m* - 3m*])6.t
~1
= =
t=l
L l 12 1
I ([3 + nu - 3m
1
t
] - [3 + m* - 3m*])6^
_1
t=l ^ X / 1 2
Let us suppose that condition (12) is satisfied; it is player 1 who will
defect from the stationary equilibrium. This means that
(15) 3 + m* - 3m* < (1 - 6^(4 - 3m*) + &
±
; or
(16) m* < 1 - 36 + 36 m*
Condition (14) can be rearranged (using only the left-hand equation) to
give:
m* - 3m*
(17) E m.6. -31 m„6 ~ = -: -
—
t=l
l L
t=l
2 X X
~
6
1
Inserting (16) into this gives
"I Tf
(18) S nW_1 - 3 Z mjfi?"1 < -, —i - 3m*
t=l
l 1
t=l
2 X X " 6 1
2
which contradicts condition (10). Thus, any equilibrium outcome in the
prisoner's dilemma can be supported by a stationary equilibrium, so the
sets defined above provide the entire set of equilibrium outcomes.
V. Perfect Equilibrium in the discounted supergame
The grim strategies usually fail to provide perfect equilibrium out-
comes, as the following simple example shows: Let the mixed extension
of a game with two players be given by:
-24-
H(m ,m ) = (m ,2m m
2
- m_ + m. - 1)
The grim strategy secures an equilibrium of the game with the stationary
result m* = 1, m* = 0, as long as the discount rate for player 2 is at
least — , and certainly for the undiscounted game. However, once player
2 has defected, it is incredible that player 1, who is in no way injured
by player 2's defection, should actually carry out the grim punishment
which costs him his entire remaining profit in the game.
In the undiscounted game, the requirement of perfection does not
actually affect the set of payoffs sustained by equilibrium behavior, a
result discovered independently by Rubens tein and by Aumann and Shapley.
We shall call this the "perfectness Folk Theorem" and include a simple
proof for the present model.
5.1 Theorem : The set of limiting average payoffs to perfect equilibria
of the undiscounted supergame coincides with the set of payoffs to equi-
libria of the undiscounted supergame.
Proof : Let y e CH(h(S)) be a feasible and individually-rational payoff:
v. > v. for each player i. We know by Theorem 4.2 that there exists an
'l—i
equilibrium of the undiscounted game with limiting average payoff ex-
actly y. Let us denote the specified sequence of this equilibrium by
m(y) = [m (y) , . . . ,m (y) , . . . ] . By the properties of the Caesaro mean,
for any finite T, we have
(19) lim i E H(mT (y)) = y
t-*» T=T
-25-
Thus, nothing that happens in finite time affects the limiting average
payoff. Now, let f be any n-tuple of supergame strategies, and m ,...,m
an arbitrary history of length t. We define the set of last defectors
from f according to m = (m , . . .,m ) ; LD(f ,m) , and the time of last
defection t*(f,m) as follows:
t' t 1 1 t'-lfmax {t'<_t: m £ f (m,...,m ) } if it exists
t*(f,m) »<
v__t + 1 otherwise
(is N: mt*(f,m) f f t*(m1 , . .
.
,m
t *"1
) } if t* = t*(f,m) < t
LD(f,m) =<
lo otherwise
Now let e be an infinite sequence of positive numbers e = o(t). We
shall define the notion of a "debt to society," by stipulating that a
player who defects at time t is to be punished until his cumulative aver-
age payoff is within e of his minmax payoff, at which point play re-
turns to the specified sequence, or until another player or players de-
fects. If another single player j defects at time t' subsequent to t,
then j is to be punished to within e of his minmax payoff; if more
than one player defects simultaneously, play returns to the cooperative
sequence. To implement this idea, we must remove from LD(f,m) those
players who have paid their debt to society. The remaining criminals
as of time t form a set C (f,m) defined by:
C
t (f,m) ={i£ LD(f,m): £ Z H.(mT ) > v. + e^ (f m) }
T<t
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We can now define a perfect equilibrium strategy with outcome y:
FT = m.(y) for all i
f
.
(m ,. . o ,m ) = f . (m) = <
pJ iff C
t (f,m) = {j}
m. otherwise
1
The following are consequences of this definition: m(f) = m(y)
,
so that
the specified sequence does indeed have the outcome y. If player i con-
templates defecting for at most a finite number of periods, his limiting
average payoff will be y. by equation (19) and the fact that C (f,m)
is always empty a finite number of periods after any last defection, if
the players adhere to f : in other words, by adding at each stage the
amount v. to player i's cumulative payoff, his cumulative average payoff
reaches the trigger level e .,.. N + v. within finite time after t*(f ,m)
.
00 t*(f,m) l
If player i defects an infinite number of times, then the strategy calls
for him to be punished forever, since the trigger level approaches v..
Now, consider any subgame in which players are punishing player i. If
player j decides to defect by not playing p., then player j is punished.
If i defects forever, he is held to v.: if he defects a finite number of
3
times, play returns to m(y) and his payoff is y.; if he does not defect,
the punishment of player i ends in finite time, so his payoff is y..
Therefore, any feasible and individually-rational y can be sustained
as a perfect equilibrium outcome by such a strategy. Since every perfect
equilibrium outcome is a fortiriori an equilibrium outcome, it follows
that the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes co-incides with the set of
equilibrium outcomes. QED
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This happy state of affairs does not persist in the discounted game,
as we can show through analysis of a simple example related to the prob-
lem of strategic control of externalities.
5.2 Example ; There are two players. In the stage game, player 1 can
take a level of precaution s- £ [0,1]. It costs him nothing to take
this precaution, but the result is a social cost of C(l - s ) where C
is a large positive number. Player 2 cannot take any precaution, but
can compensate player 1 by paying him an amount s„ from her initial
wealth of 1. Player 1 is liable for a constant share, L S (0,1), of the
social cost, and player 2 pays the balance. The payoffs to the two
players are therefore:
h
1
(x
1
,s
2
) = s
2
- L(l - s
1
)C
h
2
(slf s 2 )
= 1 - s
2
- (1 - L)(l - Sl )C
In the one shot game there is a unique equilibrium at s. = 1 = 1 - s„.
In the undiscounted supergame, we can define the set of strong equilibrium
outcomes to be the set of Pareto Optimal equilibrium outcomes; in general,
a strong equilibrium is a situation from which no coalition can defect,
making all of its members better off. Here, the only non-singleton
coalition is the pair {1,2}. A strong equilibrium outcome of the undis-
counted supergame is a pair of net wealths (a.. ,a„) s.t.
i) a + a„ = 1 (Pareto Optimality)
ii) a >_ (individual rationality for player 1)
iii) a„ > 1 - (1 - L)C (individual rationality for player 2)
-28-
The set of equilibrium outcomes can be found by replacing condition i) by
i') a. + a
2
<_ 1 (feasibility)
It is clear that player 1 can use the threat of diminishing his precau-
tion to extract some money from player 2. Moreover, by Theorem 5.1 we
know that this threat is credible in the undiscounted game, so condi-
tions i-iii also give us the set of strong perfect equilibrium outcomes
for the undiscounted game. Now let us move to the discounted game, with
both players using the same discount rate, d G (0,1). From Theorem 4.3,
we know that (a.. ,a„) is a Pareto Optimal outcome of an equilibrium
of the discounted game iff it satisfies i) , ii) , and
iv) 1 - a
2
= a
1
>_ d(l - L)C
Now suppose that player 1 wishes to punish player 2 for some defection
by playing the punishment sequence (s
, . .
.
,s
, . . .) . The ratio of the
cost to player 1 of this sequence divided by the punishment inflicted on
player 2 is:
00
Z d
t_1 [(l - s5)LC]
t=l 1 L
" t-1 t X "
L
z d
c [(i - sba - Dc]
t=i L
So that player 1 may as well react immediately to defection with a pun-
ishment sufficient to have deterred defection in the first place. How
strong must this punishment be?
If the outcome of the perfect equilibrium is to be the pair (a,l-a)
,
it is easy to see that the cheapest punishment sequence sufficient to
prevent defection is (s ,1,1,...) where
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(20) (1 - Sl)(l - L)C >|
We must now see whether player 1 will be willing to execute this punish-
ment. By the argument given above, player 1 has two alternatives, use
the specified punishment at once, or hold off forever, for a payoff of
in each period. The condition for carrying out the punishment is there-
fore
(21) (l-^LC ^- 1 - 5 !
Combining this with (20) gives us the condition for the equilibrium out-
come (a,l-a) to be sustainable as the outcome of a stationary Pareto
Optimal perfect equilibrium of the discounted supergame:
,2
(22)
da
(1 - d)LC - (1 - L)dC 1-d-l-L' ,
d
:
> ;
L
: for a t 0, L € (0,1),
d e (0,1)
Combining this condition with i, ii, and iv gives us the set of (strong)
perfect equilibrium outcomes of the discounted supergame. The set of
equilibrium outcomes is as shown below:
l-d(l-L)C-
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The set of perfect equilibrium outcomes is equal to the set of equilibrium
outcomes if condition (22) is satisfied, and is equal to the single out-
come (0,1), otherwise. We should remark, that an argument similar to that
used in analysing the set of equilibrium outcomes for the prisoner's
dilemma lets us confine our attention to stationary outcomes of equilibria
in this game.
Since there is no hope for a general result such as Theorem 5.1 for
the discounted case, we close by presenting a sufficient condition for
the set of perfect equilibrium outcomes to co-incide with the set of
equilibrium outcomes. This condition turns out to be satisfied by quite
a few games of economic interest.
5.3 Theorem : Let [N,M,H] be the mixed extension of a stage game. Sup-
pose that for each player i, there exists an n-tuple m € M of mixed
strategies for the stage game with the following properties:
i) max H. (m. ,m. .* ) = H.(m ) = v.
m
.
l
ii) for all j ^ i, H . (m ) > 6. v. + (1 - 6.)max H.(m.,m, .» )
j
Then the set of outcomes sustainable by perfect equilibria of the dis-
counted supergame co-incides with the set of outcomes sustainable by
equilibria of the discounted supergame.
Proof : Let y be an outcome sustainable by a grim-strategy equilibrium
of the discounted supergame, and m(y) the associated specified sequence.
Recalling the definition of the last defector from a strategy f given
-31-
a partial history m used in the proof of Theorem 5.1, we define a perfect
equilibrium strategy f by
i
= m
i (y)
-t, 1 t-1. -t, ,
f
.
(m , . .
.
,m ) = f
.
Cm) =
nr? iff LD(f,m) = {j}
m. (y) otherwise
To see that this is indeed a perfect equilibrium strategy combination,
we first observe that m(f) = m(y) , so that adherence to this strategy
results in a payoff of y. Secondly, notice that this strategy calls for
a grim punishment to be inflicted on any defector, regardless of whether
that defection occured while playing the specified sequence or a punish-
ment sequence. It follows that no player will wish to unilaterally de-
fect from the specified sequence. Now suppose that we are playing a
punishment sequence. The condition of the theorem states that for each
player i there is a way of implementing the grim punishment via a sta-
tionary equilibrium of the discounted supergame: by condition i) the
punished player cannot improve his payoff in any stage; and by condi-
tion ii) no other player will find it in his interest to defect from
the new stationary equilibrium. QED
As a special case, we remark that the condition is clearly satis-
fied if there is an equilibrium of the stage game that gives each player
his minmax payoff. This is clearly the case with Prisoner's Dilemma,
and also with irany economic exchange games. In the latter, a player's
-32-
security level v. is almost always the same as his payoff at the no-
trade point, so if there is a no-trade equilibrium, the Theorem applies.
Examples include: Kurz' "Altruism games"; the Shapley-Shubik-Dubey family
of exchange games; and Wilson's Competitive bidding model.
-33-
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